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STRANGERS IN A STRANGE LAND:
PERSONAL JURISDICTION ANALYSIS UNDER THE
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA or Act)' operates as a
federal long-arm statute. 2 As such, the FSIA serves as an instrument through
which United States courts can exercise jurisdiction over foreign states.3 An
issue that continues to arise under the FSIA is whether, for purposes of
obtaining personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant, the
defendant's contacts must be with the state in which the court sits or
whether minimum contacts between the foreign sovereign and the United
States as a whole suffice. If contacts between the foreign sovereign and the
United States as a whole suffice, an American plaintiff could sue the foreign
sovereign in a state where the sovereign has no contacts.4 Most courts that
have considered the issue of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA have
found that the relevant forum to be used in the due process analysis is the
United States as a whole.5 This approach, however, presents several prob-
lems.
6
Sovereign immunity is a doctrine of international law under which
domestic courts refrain from asserting jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign
to avoid possible interference with the governmental functions of the foreign
state. 7 Historically, a foreign sovereign absolutely was immune from suit
unless the sovereign consented." In 1812 the United States Supreme Court
recognized the theory of absolute immunity, a theory that predominated in
early judicial discussions and decisions. 9 Courts in the United States generally
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-1332(a)(4), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982).
2. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
1487] (discussing nature of FSIA), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE AND CONG. & AD. NEws 6604,
6612).
3. See id. at 6604 (discussing purpose of FSIA).
4. See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text (discussing application of FSIA
jurisdiction when foreign sovereign defendant had no contacts with forum state).
5. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
314 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that relevant area in determining foreign state's contacts is entire
United States); Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivanos, 712 F.
Supp. 383, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (determining that court must use foreign sovereign defendant's
aggregate contacts with entire United States in personal jurisdiction analysis). But see Meadows
v. Dominican Republic, 542 F. Supp 33, 34 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (declining to exercise jurisdiction
over foreign sovereign defendant because foreign sovereign defendant had insufficient contacts
with State of California), appeal dismissed and remanded, 720 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1983).
6. See infra notes 117-49 and accompanying text (outlining problems presented by using
entire United States as relevant forum in personal jurisdiction analysis under FSIA).
7. See 48 C.J.S. International Law § 46 (1981) (discussing development of sovereign
immunity).
8. See id. (outlining history of sovereign immunity).
9. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). In The
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accepted the theory of absolute immunity until the early 1900s when the
restrictive theory of immunity developed in the international community.10
Schooner Exchange the plaintiffs sought to reclaim a vessel allegedly belonging to them. Id.
at 118. The plaintiffs claimed that Napoleon's forces seized the vessel on the high seas and
converted the vessel into a warship. Id. The ship came into a Philadelphia port in distress
after damage at sea. Id. at 119. The Supreme Court held that an American court could not
assert jurisdiction over a vessel in which Napoleon, the reigning Emperor of France, claimed
a sovereign right. Id. at 136. In The Schooner Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall observed:
The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the nation
as an independent sovereign power.
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction
upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its
sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to
the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its
own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow
from no other legitimate source.
Id.
All subsequent sovereign immunity cases, not only in the United States, but in the British
Commonwealth as well, drew upon The Schooner Exchange and gradually expanded the
doctrine of absolute immunity to include ordinary merchant vessels that foreign governments
owned or operated. See The Parlement BeIge, 5 P.D. 197 (C.A. 1880) (expanding doctrine of
sovereign immunity to include mail packets); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562,
576 (1926) (upholding immunity plea in commercial claim against merchant ship solely on
ground that Italian government owned vessel and used vessel for public purpose).
10. See J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATioNAL LEGAL SYsTEM 335 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing
development of restrictive theory). The Supreme Court of Belgium adopted the restrictive
theory in 1903. Societe Anonyme de Chemins de Fer Liegeois Luxembourgeois v. The
Netherlands, [1903] Pasicrisie I, 294. In Egypt the Court of Appeals of the Mixed Courts
sanctioned the restrictive theory in a litigation involving the United Kingdom in 1920. Captain
Hall v. Captain Zacarias Bengoa, 33 Bulletin de Legislation et Jurisprudence Egyptiennes 25
(1920-1921). The Egyptian Court of Appeals already had made clear in a 1912 decision that
the court would apply the restrictive theory. Dame Marigo Kildani v. The Ministry of Finance
of Greece, 24 Bulletin de Legislation et Jurisprudence Egyptiennes 330 (1911-1912). By 1918
the Supreme Court of Switzerland also was applying the restrictive theory. Ministry of Finance
of Austria v. Dreyfus, [1918] Journal des Tribunaux 594. Lower courts in Italy formulated
the restrictive theory as early as 1886. The Supreme Court of Italy adopted the restrictive
theory in 1925 when a trade commission of the USSR became involved in litigation before the
Italian courts that arose from the USSR's commercial activities. Trade Delegation of the USSR
v. Ditta Tesini e Malvezzi, [1925] Giurisprudencia Italiana I, 204.
By 1928 the lower courts in Greece were declining to grant immunity to the USSR in a
suit involving a commercial act. X v. USSR, [1927-1928] Ann. Dig. 172 (No. 109). The
Supreme Court of France sanctioned the restrictive theory in 1929 when a French business
sued a trade commission of the USSR in connection with the trade commission's commercial
activities in France. USSR v. Association France-Export, [1929] Dalloz Recueil Hebomadaire
161. In 1921 the Supreme Court of Germany declined to apply the restrictive theory on the
ground that the restrictive theory had not yet acquired sufficient support to justify the theory's
application. Selling v. United States Shipping Board (The Ice King), 1921, 26 Am. J. Int'l L.
Supp. 620 (1932). The courts of the German Federal Republic since have become committed
to the restrictive theory. Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, Second Chamber, 1963,
59 Am. J. Int'l L. 654 (1965).
In the Netherlands lower courts applied the restrictive theory as early as 1916. In 1922
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Under the restrictive theory, the immunity of a foreign state is limited to
the foreign state's governmental acts (jure imperil) and does not extend to
suits based on the foreign state's commercial or private acts (jure gestionis).1
At the Brussels Convention in 1926 thirteen nations signed an agreement
that formally recognized the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.1 2 The
United States, however, did not sign the Brussels Convention document.'
3
At that time, United States courts relied heavily on State Department
suggestions in deciding whether or not to grant immunity.' 4 Although the
courts and the State Department formally had not adopted the restrictive
theory, the United States was moving away from the absolute theory of
sovereign immunity.' 5 In recognition of the development of the restrictive
theory in many foreign countries, the State Department reexamined its
policies regarding immunity of foreign sovereigns and their property. 6 In
1952 the Acting Legal Adviser of the State Department, Jack Tate, sent a
letter (the Tate letter) to the Acting Attorney General advising the Depart-
ment of Justice of the State Department's acceptance of the restrictive
theory.1 7 The Acting Legal Advisor recognized in the Tate letter that the
prior absolute theory of sovereign immunity no longer was consistent with
modem international law.' 8 The Tate letter announced the policy that a
an unclear decision of the Netherlands Supreme Court left the issue in a state of turmoil. De
Booij Case, 48 Journal du Droit International 274 (1921), 26 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 538 (1932).
In Austria the restrictive theory became a controversial issue as early as 1918. Austria's supreme
court since has become a leading advocate of the restrictive theory. Dralle v. Republic of
Czechoslovakia, 17 Int'l L. Rep. 155 (1956). As a result of the development of the restrictive
theory and the repeated denial of immunity to the USSR's trade commissions by European
courts in the years following World War I, the USSR adopted a policy of entering into
international agreements whereby the USSR's trade missions submit in advance to local
jurisdiction with respect to disputes arising from their commercial transactions. J. SWEENEY,
supra, at 336.
11. See I. BRowmu, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (3d ed. 1979)
(discussing history of sovereign immunity).
12. See id. at 329 (discussing history of sovereign immunity).
13. See id. (discussing development of sovereign immunity theory in United States).
14. See Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S.
68 (1938) (stating policy of deference to State Department's view as to whether court should
grant sovereign immunity); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) (accepting
State Department's suggestion of immunity as conclusive determination of Peru's immunity
from suit); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (stating that courts should
not deny immunity that executive branch has allowed).
15. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35 (concluding that test for
determining whether court should exercise jurisdiction is whether court's exercise of jurisdiction
would embarrass executive branch in its conduct of foreign affairs).
16. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to the Department of State to
Philip B. Perlman Acting Attorney General of the United States (May 19, 1952) [hereinafter
Tate letter] (stating that international acceptance of restrictive theory necessitated change in
United States policy) reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 985. See also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Hearings on H.R.
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
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United States court could hold a foreign sovereign government responsible
in a United States court in a dispute arising out of the sovereign's commercial
or private acts, but not out of the sovereign's public or governmental acts.19
After the publication of the Tate letter, United States courts completely
deferred to State Department suggestions concerning the granting of im-
munity. 20 If a foreign defendant wanted to invoke the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the defendant first had to petition the State Department for a
ruling that, if granted, United States courts then would follow. Under the
guidelines of the Tate Letter, a plaintiff wishing to sue a foreign sovereign
had to establish to the satisfaction of the State Department that the exercise
of jurisdiction was judicious in the light of diplomatic considerations. 2' If
the defendant failed to petition the State Department but later wished to
raise the issue of sovereign immunity, the court would make its own
determination of the defendant's status. The judiciary and the State De-
partment, therefore, jointly articulated the law concerning the application
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
In time, the State Department departed from the announced policy of
the Tate letter and made suggestions of immunity that the Department did
not base on the distinction between public acts and private acts.? Courts
accepted the Department's suggestions as binding. The departure from the
Tate letter policy resulted partly because the Tate letter placed the State
Department in a difficult position. If the Department followed the Tate
letter in a particular case, the Department was in the inconsistent position
of a political institution applying a legal standard in a case before the
of Representatives Comm. of the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 25 (1976) (testimony of
Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, State Department) [hereinafter testimony of Monroe Leigh]
(acknowledging trend away from absolute theory in international law).
19. Tate letter, supra note 16, at 985.
20. See National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360 (1955)
(determining that status and activities of foreign government are foreign policy matters for
consideration by political branch of government); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General
de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir.) (stating that courts would defer
to State Department policy to avert possible embarrassment to executive branch in conducting
foreign relations), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1964). The United States courts' practice of
allowing the Department of State to control the grant of immunity was unique in the
international system. J. Swaa-EY, Tim INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYsTEM 335 (3d ed. 1988). In
no other country was a suggestion of immunity considered binding by the courts. Id.
21. Tate letter, supra note 16, at 985; see also Note, Effects Jurisdiction Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Due Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 474, 478
(1980) (discussing immunity decisions under Tate letter).
22. See Tate letter, supra note 16, at 985 (announcing State Department policy of
following restrictive theory of sovereign immunity); Southeastern Leasing Corp. v. Stern
Dragger Belogorsk Etc., 493 F.2d 1223, 1224 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that courts should accept
certificate and grant of sovereign immunity issued by State Department without further inquiry);
Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1200 (2d Cir.) (deferring to
State Department's suggestion of immunity although foreign sovereign defendant's actions
were of purely private nature), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba,
S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1961) (holding that courts should accept certificate and grant
of sovereign immunity issued by State Department without further inquiry).
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courts.? If the Department disregarded the Tate letter in a given case, it
was abandoning the very international law principle that the Department
meant to observe.2 Moreover, from a diplomatic standpoint, executive
involvement in the immunity decision placed the United States at a disad-
vantage. Under the United States system, a foreign sovereign defendant
could choose which cases the sovereign would bring to the State Department
and, therefore, in which cases the sovereign would raise diplomatic consid-
erations. 2 The United States, on the other hand, was unable to benefit
from the raising of diplomatic considerations in foreign litigation to which
the United States was a party because in virtually every other country in
the world sovereign immunity was a question of international law decided
exclusively by the courts and not by institutions concerned with foreign
affairs. 26
In response to criticism of the State Department's involvement in
immunity determinations, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act.27 The Act followed the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 28
In enacting the FSIA Congress had four objectives: to transfer the deter-
mination of sovereign immunity to the judicial branch; to codify the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity; to make foreign states more
susceptible to execution on judgments that United States courts rendered
against them; and to provide a means for serving process on a foreign
state. 29 By placing immunity decision-making authority in the judiciary,
Congress eliminated the possibility that foreign governments would place
political pressure on the State Department to recognize the government's
immunity from suit. Congress intended judicial determination of immunity
to reduce the foreign policy implications of immunity decisions. 0 Under the
FSIA courts must decide whether the activity involved is commercial or
governmental to determine if the activity triggers the exceptions to sovereign
immunity listed in the Act." United States courts, therefore, must apply
the restrictive theory in making sovereign immunity decisions .2 The Act




27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982); see also
H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 2, at 6605 (recognizing need for firm standards regarding
when foreign state validly can assert defense of sovereign immunity).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982) (precluding use of sovereign immunity as defense
when foreign state is acting in commercial capacity); H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 2, at
6605 (stating that one objective of FSIA was to codify restrictive theory of sovereign immunity).
29. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Speaker of the House, accompanying the
draft bill of the FSIA (Oct. 31, 1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
6634.
30. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 2, at 6605 (stating principal purpose of FSIA
was reduction in foreign policy implications of immunity decisions).
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982) (preventing use of foreign sovereign immunity
defense when foreign state is acting in commercial capacity).
32. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 2, at 6605 (stating that one objective
of FSIA was to codify restrictive theory of sovereign immunity).
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assures litigants that courts will make immunity decisions on purely legal
grounds under provisions assuring due process."
Congress intended, and cases pursuant to the FSIA have held, that
foreign sovereign defendants must assert sovereign immunity from suit as
an affirmative defense.3 4 Section 1604 of the Act establishes sovereignty as
an affirmative defense that challenges the competency of the court to
adjudicate a claim involving a foreign sovereign.35 To raise the sovereign
immunity defense a party must plead that the party is a foreign state or a
political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign state. 36 Once a
defendant establishes its sovereignty for purposes of the Act, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the court nonetheless is competent to adjudicate the
claim because the defendant's act falls under one of the exceptions to
sovereign immunity named in section 1605. 37 If the defendant's act falls
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 2, at 6612
(stating that FSIA requires minimum jurisdictional contacts). In addition to the United States,
the United Kingdom has codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The United
Kingdom became a signatory to the European Convention on State Immunity of May 16,
1972. The European Convention on State Immunity incorporates the restrictive theory. 11
INT'L LEGAL MATmiAms 470 (1972). The convention entered into force on June 11, 1976. 24
INT'L LEGAL MATmRALs 933 (1985). In order to give effect to the convention, the United
Kingdom enacted the State Immunity Act of 1978. 17 Ir'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1123 (1978).
Following its incorporation in the legislation of the United States and the United Kingdom,
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity began to spread to the rest of the common-law
world. See 20 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATiONAL LAW 79 (1982) (discussing Canada's
adoption of the restrictive theory). Additionally, learned societies have come to support the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The International Law Association adopted a draft
convention incorporating the theory at its 1982 meeting and directed its Executive Council to
make the draft available to the International Law Commission of the United Nations for the
commission's consideration in connection with the commission's study of sovereign immunity.
See 22 Int'l Legal Materials 287 (1983) (containing draft articles of International Law Asso-
ciation). In 1983 the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American
States approved for ratification a draft convention which incorporated the restrictive theory.
22 INT'L LEGAL MATERmLs 292 (1983). The 1987 Restatement concluded that nearly all non-
Communist states now accept the restrictive theory. RESTATEMENT (THIaRD) OF FORMN RELA-
TIONS LAW § 451 comment a (1987).
34. See H.R. REPORT No. 1487, supra note 2, at 6616 (stating that under FSIA sovereign
immunity is affirmative defense); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
482 (1983) (indicating that foreign defendants must assert sovereign immunity as affirmative
defense); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1112 n.10 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); Meadows
v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 521-22 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976
(1987).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982). Section 1604 states that:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at
the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections
1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
Id.
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1982) (defining "foreign state" for immunity determination
under FSIA).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982). Section 1605 states:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
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into one of the listed exceptions, the court has subject matter jurisdiction."
If the court determines that the court has subject matter jurisdiction,
the court next must consider whether it has personal jurisdiction over the
foreign sovereign defendant.3 9 Subsection (b) of section 1330 provides:
"Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist to every claim for
relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a)
States or the States in any case-
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or
by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the
foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms
of the waiver;
(2) in which the action is based upon the commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
that act causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are
at issue and that property or any property exchanged for that property is
present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or
any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instru-
mentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States;
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succession
or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are
in issue; or
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death,
or damage to property, occurring in the United States and caused by the
tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee
of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment; except that this paragraph shall not apply to-
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless
of whether the discretion be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights.
(b) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States in any case in which a suit in admiralty is brought to enforce a
maritime lien against a vessel of cargo of the foreign state, which maritime lien is
based upon a commercial activity of the foreign state. ...
Id.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982). Section 1330(a) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section
1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title
or under any applicable international agreement.
Id.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1982).
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where service has been made under section 1608 of this title." 4 The Act,
therefore, makes the statutory aspect of personal jurisdiction simple: subject
matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal jurisdiction.4' The
Act, however, cannot create personal jurisdiction in violation of the foreign
sovereign's right to due process.4 2 Accordingly, each finding of personal
jurisdiction under the FSIA also requires a due process scrutiny of the
court's power to exercise the court's authority over a particular defendant.
43
The FSIA's legislative history indicates that section 1330(b) includes the
requirement of minimum jurisdictional contacts. 44 The House Report com-
pares section 1330(b) with the United States Supreme Court's decision in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.45 International Shoe is the first in a
line of cases that defines modern due process requirements for personal
jurisdiction.46 In International Shoe the State of Washington sued a Delaware
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person will be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that FSIA cannot create personal
jurisdiction when constitutional due process constraints forbid personal jurisdiction), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio and Television, 691
F.2d 1344, 1352 (l1th Cir. 1982) (same); Walpex Trading v. Yacimientos Petroliferos, 712 F.
Supp.383, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same).
43. See infra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional constraints on
courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction under FSIA).
44. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 2, at 6612.
45. Id.; 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
46. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe
the Supreme Court considered whether it was permissible under the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause for a Washington state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-
of-state corporation on the basis of the corporation's activities within Washington when the
lawsuit was limited to the recovery of unpaid contributions to Washington's unemployment
compensation fund. Id. at 311. The State of Washington sued International Shoe Co., an out-
of-state corporation with its primary place of business in Missouri, before a Washington state
agency to recover unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund. Id.
International Shoe employed approximately 12 salespersons in Washington to solicit orders
within the state. Id. at 313. The sales staff had no authority to enter into contracts or to
make collections. Id. at 314. The sales staff transmitted the orders it had solicited to the home
office, where the corporation either accepted or rejected the orders. Id. International Shoe
had no office in Washington and maintained no stock of merchandise in Washington. Id. at
313. The corporation made a special appearance to challenge the Washington court's exercise
of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 312. On appeal the Supreme Court of Washington held that
the Washington court's exercise of jurisdiction was proper on the ground that regular and
systematic solicitation of orders in Washington by International Shoe's sales staff constituted
doing business. Id. at 314. International Shoe appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Id. at 311.
The Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause gives a
court authority to exercise personal jurisdiction only if minimum contacts, ties, or relations
exist between the defendant and the forum state. Id. at 317. The International Shoe Court
determined that such minimum contacts existed between the corporation and Washington
because the corporation's in-state activities were neither irregular nor casual. Id. at 320.
Moreover, the Court held that the defendant's contacts with Washington were systematic and
1166
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corporation for failing to pay assessments into the State's unemployment
compensation fund.4 7 The corporation claimed that the Washington court
did not have personal jurisdiction because the corporation did not maintain
offices in Washington. 48 In International Shoe the United States Supreme
Court held that Washington had personal jurisdiction over the Delaware
corporation. 49 The Court stated that the defendant did not have to be
physically present in Washington for a court in Washington to exercise
personal jurisdiction. 0 The plaintiff could sue the Delaware corporation in
Washington as long as the corporation had minimum contacts with the
state." The Court explained that:
Whether due process is satisfied must depend... upon the quality
and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a
state may make binding a judgment in personam against an indi-
vidual or corporate defendant with which the State has no contacts,
ties or relations.
5 2
The International Shoe Court stated that an analysis of the corporation's
inconvenience in defending suit in Washington was necessary to determine
if personal jurisdiction in the forum state was reasonable.5 3 The Court
conceded, as the defendant argued, that the corporation maintained no
offices in Washington.5 4 The International Shoe Court found, however, that
the corporation hired salesmen in Washington. 55 The Court concluded that
the corporation's contacts with the forum state, through the activities of
the corporation's Washington based salesmen, were sufficient to give the
Washington court personal jurisdiction.5 6
continuous and accorded the defendant the benefits and protection of the laws of Washington.
Id. The International Shoe court determined, therefore, that the Washington court's exercise
of personal jurisdiction was fair in that it did not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. Id. Consequently, the Court held that the Washington court's exercise of
jurisdiction was proper under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Id. at 321; see
also infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's refinement of
International Shoe personal jurisdiction analysis in later cases).
47. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311.
48. Id. at 312.
49. Id. at 320.
50. Id. at 316.
51. Id. at 317.
52. Id. at 319.
53. Id. at 317.
54. Id. at 313.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 320. International law does not require that a defendant have minimum
contacts with a particular state or subdivision. RSTATEMENT (Tssnw) oF FOREiGN RELATIONS
LAw § 402 commentary (1987). Whether courts require a particular defendant to have minimum
contacts with the foreign state is generally a question only of United States law. Id. If a
nation justifiably can exert jurisdiction over the alien defendant, then for international law
purposes, it is not important how the nation allocates that power among political subdivisions
within the country. Id.
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Cases after International Shoe have refined the Court's minimum con-
tacts analysis.5 7 In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.5 8 the Supreme
Court held proper the forum state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
an insurance company whose only contact with the state stemmed from a
contract with a resident of the forum state.5 9 In concluding that the trial
court properly exercised personal jurisdiction, the Court stated that the
forum state's interest in providing claimants with access to the court system
outweighed any inconvenience to the insurance company.6 In Hanson v.
Denckla6l the Court found that a Florida court could not gain personal
jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee.62 Personal jurisdiction was improper,
the Court held, because the transaction that gave rise to the cause of action
was not consummated in the forum state.63 The Court explained that the
trustee had not invoked the benefit and protection of the forum state's laws
because the trustee had not deliberately taken advantage of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state.64 In World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson,61 New York residents sued a New York automobile
dealer in an Oklahoma court for damages that resulted from a car accident
in Oklahoma. 6 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that foreseea-
bility alone is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on a nonresident
57. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957) (holding that
forum state's interest in providing access to court system outweighed inconvenience to defen-
dant); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 233 (1958) (holding that defendant must purposely
avail itself of privilege of conducting activities within forum state for forum state to have
personal jurisdiction over defendant); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 295 (1980) (holding that defendant's contacts with forum state must make it foreseeable
that defendant would be subject to suit in forum state).
58. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
59. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). In McGee the United
States Supreme Court upheld California's exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
insurance company in a suit by a California resident to collect the proceeds of an insurance
policy that the company issued to a California resident. Id.
60. Id.
61. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
62. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). In Hanson the Supreme Court
determined that Florida's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a Delaware trust company was
invalid. Id. Hanson involved a family fight over the assets of a deceased mother, who had
established a trust in Delaware before moving to Florida, where the mother died. Id. at 238-
40. The dispute concerned whether Florida or Delaware courts had jurisdiction over the
Delaware trust; that dispute turned on whether Florida could acquire jurisdiction over the
Delaware trustee. Id. at 240. The Hanson Court held that Florida's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee was invalid because the trustee had no purposeful
contacts with Florida. Id. at 253. The Court determined that the in-state activities of the
trustee were not purposeful in the sense that the trustee did not purposely avail itself of the
opportunity to conduct activities within Florida, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
Florida's laws. Id.
63. Id. at 251.
64. Id. at 253.
65. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
66. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980).
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defendant.6 7 The Court stated that, to confer personal jurisdiction, a defen-
dant's deliberate activity in the forum state must be such that a future suit
against the defendant in the forum state is foreseeable.
6 1
International Shoe and its progeny indicate that, even if a court deter-
mines that a defendant has crossed the minimum contacts threshold, the
court still may not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant unless
the court is able to find that asserting jurisdiction is consistent with notions
of fair play and substantial justice.6 9 The International Shoe standard, as
the Supreme Court further refined that standard in the Court's later
decisions, defines the constitutional limitations on a court's power to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Courts have held and Congress has
recognized that courts must observe these constitutional limitations on the
court's power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
under the FSIA. 70 In Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nigeria7' the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
interpreted the FSIA and the FSIA's legislative history to require a due
process analysis of the court's power that examines the contacts of a foreign
state with the entire United States rather than the contacts with the individual
forum state.
72
Texas Trading arose out of a breach of several contracts by the Federal
Republic of Nigeria and its Central Bank.73 The Nigerian government had
executed 109 contracts with sixty-eight suppliers to purchase over sixteen
million metric tons of cement at a price close to one billion dollars.7 4
Nigerian docks and harbors became crowded with ships loaded with ce-
ment. 75 More vessels continued to arrive daily.7 6 The Nigerian government
67. Id. at 295.
68. Id. at 297.
69. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945); see also Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) (holding that Delaware's exercise of jurisdiction was unfair
and, therefore, invalid even though defendant owned property in Delaware); Burger King v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (determining that even after court has decided that
defendant purposely established minimum contacts with forum state, court may consider
contacts in light of other factors to determine whether assertion of personal jurisdiction would
comport with fair play and substantial justice); Asahi Metal Indust. Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (holding that exercise of jurisdiction was unreasonable despite
defendant's contacts with forum state).
70. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 2, at 6612 (stating that FSIA requires minimum
jurisdictional contacts); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647
F.2d 300, 313 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that FSIA cannot create personal jurisdiction where
constitutional due process constraints forbid personal jurisdiction), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148
(1982); Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1352 (11th Cir.
1982) (same); Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos, 712 F. Supp. 383, 390 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (same); supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional constraints on
courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction under FSIA).
71. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d. at 300.
72. Id. at 314.
73. Id. at 302-06.
74. Id. at 303.
75. Id. at 302.
76. Id.
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became unable to accept delivery and repudiated the government's contracts
with the cement suppliers.7 7 Consequently, Texas Trading & Milling Cor-
poration, a supplier, brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York against the Republic of Nigeria. 7 The
Nigerian government invoked the defense of sovereign immunity under the
FSIA. 79 The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
and personal jurisdiction. s0 The district court reasoned that, because all
contract negotiations between the parties occurred outside of the United
States, Nigerian law governed the contracts."' Additionally, the district court
determined that the only effect in the United States was that the letters of
credit were payable to the New York plaintiff through a New York bank.1
2
Accordingly, the district court held that insufficient direct effects existed in
the United States to support jurisdiction under the FSIA.83 Texas Trading
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
4
On appeal the Second Circuit addressed the availability of sovereign im-
munity as a defense, the presence of subject matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's claims, and the propriety of personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dants. s5 First, the court of appeals held that subject matter jurisdiction over
Nigeria was proper. The Second Circuit determined that subject matter
jurisdiction was proper because Nigeria was acting in a commercial capacity
and, therefore, that sovereign immunity was not a defense. 6 Accordingly,
the court next considered the constitutional constraints on exercising statu-
tory personal jurisdiction over the defendants.8 7 In analyzing whether the
defendant's relevant contacts satisfied due process requirements, the Second
Circuit first considered whose contacts were relevant.88 The court found
that the Central Bank of Nigeria's commercial contacts and activities could
be charged to the Republic of Nigeria and that the contacts of the New
York correspondent bank, Morgan Guaranty Trust, could be charged to
the Republic of Nigeria and the Central Bank of Nigeria.89 Having found
77. Id.
78. Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 500 F.Supp. 320,
322, (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 321.
81. Id. at 325-27.
82. Id. at 323.
83. Id. at 326.
84. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 306
(2d Cir. 1981); cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 310.
87. Id. at 313-15.
88. Id. at 314.
89. Id. The Texas Trading court looked to the financial arrangements of the cement
supply contracts in its examination of the relevant contacts. Id. The Second Circuit noted that
Nigeria, as part of the supply contracts, established letters of credit with the Central Bank of
Nigeria (Central Bank) and advised the letters of credit through the Morgan Guaranty Trust
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that the activities involved in the dispute could be charged to the Republic
of Nigeria, the court next considered the relevant geographical area for
purposes of delineating the minimum contacts necessary for personal juris-
diction.90 The Texas Trading court held that the area with which the
defendants must have minimum contacts was the entire United States, not
merely the State of New York where the action was pending. 9' The Second
Circuit found that personal and subject matter jurisdiction existed under
the FSIA and that the Republic of Nigeria had sufficient minimum contacts
with the United States through Nigeria's New York correspondent bank to
satisfy constitutional constraints. 92 Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed
the district court's order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
In Texas Trading the contacts of both the Nigerian government and the
Central Bank with the United States were in New York, the forum state. 93
Company (Morgan) of New York. Id. at 304. The Texas Trading court found that under the
letters of credit, each seller was to present appropriate documents to Morgan, not to the
named Central Bank. Id.
The Second Circuit further noted that after the Nigerian docks and harbors became
clogged with ships delivering cement, the Central Bank instructed Morgan not to pay under
the letters of credit unless the supplier submitted-in addition to the documents required by
the letter of credit as written-a statement from Central Bank that Morgan should make
payment. Id. at 305. The Texas Trading court indicated that Nigeria's unilateral alteration of
the letters of credit was the crucial step leading to the lawsuits against Nigeria. Id. The Second
Circuit determined that the court could charge the Central Bank's activities to Nigeria and
Morgan's activities to the Central Bank and Nigeria. Id. at 314. The Texas Trading court
reasoned that if Morgan had not performed for the Central Bank, and the Central for Nigeria,
the entire payment mechanism supporting the cement contracts, Nigeria would have been
required to make the payments directly. Id.
90. Id. at 314.
91. Id. In determining that courts should examine national rather than forum state
contacts in personal jurisdiction analysis under the FSIA, the Second Circuit in Texas Trading
stated:
Since service was made under § 1608, the relevant area in delineating contacts is the
entire United States, not merely [the forum state of] New York. Compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 1608 (service of process provision for FSIA) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(t) (service of
process provision for antitrust laws), 77v (same for securities laws). See Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc. 519 F.2d 974, 998-1000 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); Leasco Data
Processing Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id.
92. Id. at 314-15. In its personal jurisdiction analysis, the Texas Trading court determined
that the Central Bank, and through the Central Bank Nigeria, had repeatedly and purposely
availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in the United States as a whole. Id.
at 314. The contacts examined by the Second Circuit, however, all involved the forum state
of New York. Id. The Texas Trading court determined that the Central Bank sent employees
to New York for training, kept large cash balances in New York, and maintained a custody
account in New York. Id. Furthermore, the Second Circuit found that the Central Bank made
it a regular practice to advise letters of credit through Morgan, a New York company, and to
use Morgan as the Central Bank's means of paying bills throughout the world. Id. Conse-
quently, the contacts examined by the Second Circuit in Texas Trading all concerned the
forum state of New York.
93. Id.
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Accordingly, the Texas Trading court did not have to address a situation
in which, although the defendant conducted some business in the United
States, the plaintiff brought suit in a state where the defendant did not
conduct any business. Nevertheless, courts subsequently have followed the
Second Circuit's broad interpretation of forum for the minimum contacts
test in cases in which the defendant had no relevant contacts with the forum
state. For example, in Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio and Televi-
sion,94 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit used
the Iranian defendants' contacts with New York in determining that a
Florida district court's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants was
proper.
In Harris an American manufacturer brought suit against Iranian de-
fendants seeking a judgment declaring the supply contract between the
parties to have been terminated by force majeure as a result of the Iranian
revolution and the subsequent crisis created when Iranian militants seized
hostages at the United States Embassy. 95 The United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida granted preliminary injunctive relief.
96
The defendants appealed, challenging the jurisdiction of the district court.97
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit stated that the defendant's contacts with
the State of New York, not the forum state of Florida, determined the
result of the constitutional due process analysis required under the FSIA.9
Citing World-Wide Volkswagen and Texas Trading, the court held that the
foreign state's contacts with New York were sufficient minimum contacts
with the entire United States to satisfy due process constraints." Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction
over the defendants and upheld the district court's grant of preliminary
relief. 100
94. 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982).
95. Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio and Television, 691, 693 F.2d 1344 (lth
Cir. 1982).
96. Id. at 1346. In Harris an American manufacturer brought suit against Iranian
defendants seeking to enjoin payment and receipt of payment on a guarantee and receipt of
payment on a letter of credit, and also seeking a judgment declaring the contract underlying
the guarantee and the letter of credit to have been terminated as a result of the Iranian
revolution and the following crisis. Id. at 1346-49. The district court granted the injunctive
relief that the manufacturer requested. Id. at 1349.
97. Id. at 1346. The defendants in Harris argued that the defendants had sovereign
immunity, which deprived the district court of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Id. at
1349.
98. Id. at 1352-53.
99. Id.; see also Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647
F.2d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that courts must apply "minimum contacts" standard
to determine if maintenance of suit is consistent with due process), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1148 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-99 (1980) (deter-
mining that notions of fairness are satisfied if defendants could reasonably anticipate being
subject to suit in the forum state).
100. Harris, 691 F.2d at 1357-58. In upholding the district court's exercise of jurisdiction,
the Eleventh Circuit in Harris examined the defendants' contacts with the United States as a
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A district court in Arkansas also has used the national contacts analysis
to evaluate the propriety of exercising jurisdiction over an agency of the
Mexican Government.' 0' In Banker's Trust Co. v. Worldwide Transportation
Services'0 2 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas held that the foreign agency's extensive economic activity in the
United States when the agency repeatedly and purposely availed itself of
the privilege of conducting business in this country satisfied due process
requirements. 0 3 Consistent with the Second Circuit's interpretation in Texas
Trading, the Banker's Trust court held that national rather than forum
state contacts are determinative in any due process minimum contacts
analysis under the FSIA.1°4
Not all courts, however, have followed this broad interpretation of
forum in the courts' due process analyses. 05 In contrast to Texas Trading,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in
Meadows v. Dominican Republic'°6 declined to exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant foreign state because the defendant state lacked sufficient contacts
with the State of California.107 The Meadows court acknowledged that the
Second Circuit in Texas Trading had applied a minimum contacts analysis
based on any contact with the entire United States. 08 The district court in
Meadows, however, found that the Second Circuit merely was applying the
traditional minimum contacts analysis with respect to the forum state
because the plaintiff in Texas Trading brought suit in New York, which
was where the defendant actually conducted business.' °9
whole. Id. at 1353. Consequently, the Harris court determined that the defendants' contacts
with the State of New York, through the defendants' maintenance of an active office in New
York City, were sufficient to render the defendants amenable to suit in Florida. Id.
101. Banker's Trust Co. v. Worldwide Transp. Serv., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1101 (E.D. Ark.
1982).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1110.
104. Id. at 1108-09. The district court in Banker's Trust cited the Second Circuit's opinion
in Texas Trading and courts that have followed the Second Circuit's approach to personal
jurisdiction analysis under the FSIA to support the district court's ruling that national rather
than forum state contacts were determinative in the court's due process analysis under the
FSIA. Id.
105. See Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 542 F. Supp. 33, 34 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (declining
to exercise jurisdiction over foreign state defendant because defendant lacked contacts with
the forum state), appeal reversed and remanded, 720 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 976 (1987); Olsen v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 648 (9th Cir.) (requiring
contacts with forum state in due process analysis under FSIA), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 917
(1984) ; infra notes 106-15 and accompanying text (discussing Meadows and Olsen courts'
departure from Second Circuit's Texas Trading approach.
106. Meadows, 542 F. Supp. at 33.
107. Id. at 34.
108. Id.; see also Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314 (holding that contacts with entire United
States were determinative in due process analysis under FSIA).
109. Meadows, 542 F. Supp. at 34. In finding that national contacts were determinative,
the district court in Meadows recognized that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
not ruled on the forum issue at the time the district court decided Meadows. Id.
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Since the Meadows decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit effectively has rejected Texas Trading by holding that to
satisfy due process requirements the foreign sovereign must have contacts
with the forum state. 110 In Olsen v. Government of Mexico"' a Mexican
government aircraft crashed in California.112 The Ninth Circuit required
contacts with the State of California in the court's due process examina-
tion."' In deciding whether or not Mexico's contacts were sufficient, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that Mexico purposely availed itself of the benefits
of operating Mexico's aircraft over California and that the plaintiff's claims
arose from the flight and the crash of the plane in California." 4 Conse-
quently, the Olsen court determined that the Mexican government had
sufficient contacts with California to make the exercise of jurisdiction
proper.1 15 The Meadows and Olsen decisions, therefore, represent a conflict
among the circuits regarding the application of the national contacts due
110. See Olsen v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 648-51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 917 (1984). In Olsen the Ninth Circuit considered whether a Florida district court
could properly exercise jurisdiction over Mexico in a case arising from the crash of a Mexican
government airplane in California. Id. at 644. The Olsen court examined Mexico's contacts
with California, the forum state, when making the court's due process analysis. Id. at 649. In
Olsen the Ninth Circuit did not expressly reject the national contacts approach used by the
Second Circuit in Texas Trading. The Olsen court, however, did not refer to Texas Trading
in the court's personal jurisdiction analysis. Id. at 648-49. The Ninth Circuit's refusal to
examine national contacts in Olsen constitutes an effective rejection of the Second Circuit's
approach in Texas Trading.
Ill. Id. at 641.
112. Id. at 643-44. In Olsen the Ninth Circuit considered whether a California district
court properly dismissed an action arising from the crash of a Mexican government aircraft
in California for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 643. In Olsen children brought suit for
the wrongful death of the children's parents, who were prisoners of the Mexican government.
Id. at 643-44. The parents were killed in a plane crash that occurred as the Mexican government
was transferring the parents to authorities in the United States. Id. The California district
court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. The district court held that
general contacts between the defendant and the forum state of California provided no basis
for jurisdiction. Id. at 643. Additionally, the district court concluded that personal jurisdiction
based on defendant's forum related activities would be unreasonable and therefore violative
of due process requirements. Id.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that Mexico was not immune from suit under
the FSIA and that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction would be consistent with due
process requirements. Id. at 648-49. The Ninth Circuit in Olsen reasoned that the plaintiffs'
claims fell within the exception for noncommercial torts provided by § 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA
and, therefore, Mexico was not immune from suit. Id. at 648. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit
determined that Mexico purposely availed itself of the benefits of operating Mexico's aircraft
over California and, therefore, California's exercise of personal jurisdiction would be reason-
able. Id. at 649. The Ninth Circuit did not cite Texas Trading in the court's Olsen due process
analysis. Id. at 648. By requiring contacts with the forum state of California in Olsen, however,
the Ninth Circuit effectively rejected the national contacts approach taken by the Second
Circuit in Texas Trading.
113. Id. at 648-49.
114. Id. at 649.
115. Id. at 649.
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process test that the Second Circuit established in Texas Trading.11 6
The utilization of the entire United States as the relevant forum in the
personal jurisdiction analysis under the FSIA presents several problems."
7
The Texas Trading court relied upon cases brought under the federal
antitrust and securities laws for authority to undertake a due process analysis
using national contacts rather than state contacts."8 In Texas Trading the
Second Circuit implied that, because nationwide service of process was
constitutional under antitrust and securities laws, the relevant area for
delineating contacts under the FSIA should be the entire United States." 9
Unlike actions based on antitrust and securities laws, however, a uniform
federal standard governing the liability of a foreign state in actions arising
out of contract or tort theories does not exist. While the FSIA sets forth
procedures for bringing suit against a foreign state, courts must determine
substantive issues of liability under state law. 120 If courts employ the Texas
Trading concept of national contacts rather than the traditional approach
followed by the Ninth Circuit in Olsen, any district court within the United
States may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant if the
defendant has minimum contacts with any part of the United States.' 2' The
116. Compare supra notes 72-104 and accompanying text (discussing courts that have
examined foreign sovereign defendants' national contacts in personal jurisdiction analysis under
FSIA) with supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text (discussing courts that have examined
foreign sovereign defendants' forum state contacts in personal jurisdiction analysis under
FSIA).
117. See infra notes 118-49 and accompanying text (discussing problems presented by
utilization of entire United States as relevant forum in personal jurisdiction analysis under
FSIA).
118. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
119. Id.; see also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 998-1000 (2d Cir.)
(holding that nationwide service of process was proper under Securities Exchange Act of 1934),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974)
(same); Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir.
1972) (same).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 2, at 6604 (stating that FSIA provides means
for determining when foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity).
121. See Olsen, 729 F.2d at 649 (using forum state contacts in due process analysis under
FSIA); Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314 (holding that courts should use contacts with entire
United States in due process analysis under FSIA). Despite the potential for unfair assertion
of personal jurisdiction by courts over foreign sovereign defendants, the venue provisions of
the FSIA appear to provide some relief for foreign states. Section 1391(f) of the FSIA defines
the proper venue of an action against a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1391() (1982). Under §
1391(), there are four express provisions for venue in civil actions brought against foreign
states: (1) the action may be brought in the judicial district where a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; (2) if the action is a suit in admiralty
to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of a foreign state, the action may be
brought" in the judicial district in which the vessel or cargo is located; (3) if the action is
brought against the agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, it may be brought in the
judicial district where the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do business or is doing
business; or (4) the action may be brought in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. Id. The venue provisions might eliminate some unfairness in the application of
1175
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1159
district selected by the plaintiff will determine which state's laws shall apply.
Accordingly, the national contacts approach may subject a foreign state or
the instrumentality of a foreign sovereign to the inconsistencies of the laws
of various states, depending on where the plaintiff commences the action,
unless the foreign state succeeds in having the action transferred to another
district court on forum non conveniens grounds." The national contacts
approach thus enables a plaintiff to shop for a forum with laws favorable
to the plaintiff's case.' 23
Additionally, because violation of the securities and antitrust laws that
the Second Circuit cited in Texas Trading involve the entire United States
economy, Congress determined that nationwide service of process was
appropriate. When passing the Sherman Antitrust Act, Congress believed
that only litigation which included all members of a business combination
could deal with the nationwide nature of monopolies and cartels.' 24 Ac-
cordingly, Congress added a provision to the Sherman Antitrust Act that
allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over defendants anywhere in
the country if "the ends of justice" so require.' 23 The legislative history of
the FSIA. The venue provisions, however, are broad and leave room for inequitable assertion
of personal jurisdiction.
122. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 490 n.15 (1983) (stating
that FSIA did not appear to affect traditional doctrine of forum non conveniens). Forum non
conveniens refers to the discretionary power of a court to decline jurisdiction over an action
when the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice would better be served if the
action were brought and tried in another forum. BLACK's LAW DIcTioNARY 589-90 (5th ed.
1979).
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(0 (1982) (limiting plaintiff's choice of forum under FSIA);
infra note 121 (discussing effect of FSIA's venue provision on due process analysis).
124. See 21 CONG. REc. 2640 (1890). When explaining his amendment to the Sherman
Antitrust Act that provided for nationwide service of process, Senator Spooner (Wis.) stated:
Most if not all of the combinations, however they may be called, aimed at by the
bill are detrimental to the public interest. I think ... it will be agreed that two of
them, whose ramifications extend throughout the whole country and who directly
affect the people generally in the country, the sugar trust and what is called the
beef combine, are infamous in their oppression, the sugar trust dealing with an
article which goes into the daily consumption of the people, which goes into every
house, to every family. I believe 52 pounds per year per capita are used by the
people of the United States. The object of this trust is to keep up to the consumers
the price of sugar. The beef combine . . . has been so successful as to maintain at
the war rate the price of beef to consumers throughout the United State, and to
depress it among those, the farmers and others, who raise cattle, so as to render
that industry no longer a profitable one.
The sugar trust is made up, as I understand it, of seventeen different corpo-
rations, some of them citizens of different States. Manifestly to deal sufficiently
with a trust or combination of that character it must be possible to bring one action,
into one court, the essential parties defendant.
Id.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1988). The personal jurisdiction provision of the Sherman Act states:
Whenever it shall appear to the court ... that the ends of justice require that other
parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be
summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not; and
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the Sherman Antitrust Act clearly indicates that Congress wanted to ensure
that federal courts would have the power to order effective remedies through
nationwide injunctions if necessary.12 6 Furthermore, the legislative history
reveals Congress' recognition that the federal government would have to
initiate multiple identical suits in separate judicial districts unless the gov-
ernment could join the relevant defendants in a single suit. 27 Both the desire
for an effective remedy and the attempt to conserve government resources
convinced Congress to expand federal court jurisdiction in the federal
antitrust laws.' 2
In addition to providing the federal courts with nationwide personal
jurisdiction in federal antitrust laws, Congress provided the federal courts
with nationwide personal jurisdiction in cases arising under the federal
securities laws. Like the antitrust legislation, the securities legislation was a
congressional response to a nationwide economic problem. 29 Each of the
six federal statutes Congress enacted between 1933 and 1940 to regulate
securities contains a provision authorizing federal courts to exercise nation-
wide personal jurisdiction. 30 Although the legislative history says nothing
subpoenas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof.
Id.
126. See 21 CONG. REc. 2640-41 (1890). In addition to recognizing the nationwide effect
of trusts, Senator Spooner (Wis.) stated:
For myself, I think the efficacious remedy will be found to be, not the criminal
prosecution provided for by the Senator from Texas but the vigorous and drastic
use of the writ of injunction. Under the law as it stands to-day that writ can only
be served and punishment for its disobedience enforced within the district over which
the court has jurisdiction. By the amendment which I have sent to the desk, this
writ of injunction may be served anywhere within the United States, and if it is
disobeyed the attachment for contempt may be served anywhere within the United
States. I think the amendment ought to be adopted.
Id.
127. See 21 CONG. REc. 2642 (1890). In addition to recognizing the need for conserving
government resources Senator Spooner (Wis.) stated:
[A]II of these trusts, or nearly all of them, are made up of different firms, of
corporations, and of citizens of different States ... [A]s the law now stands, ...
the statutory rule is that no man shall, with a single exception or so, be sued in the
United States courts except in the district where he happens to reside or where he
happens to be found. So, then, in prosecuting the sugar trust under the provisions
of this act, made up of seventeen distinct corporations, as I understand it, only one
of which, if you please, is a citizen of the State of New York, there would be no
power to obtain jurisdiction in a single suit except over one. Seventeen different
suits would be necessary, possibly. That, it seemed to me, was a weakness in this
bill which ought to be remedied.
Id.
128. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of federal
antitrust laws).
129. See L. Loss, Sncuitrrs LEGISLATION 119-21 (1961). Congress passed the legislation
regulating securities in the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929 and the realizations
of stock market manipulations and fraud. Id. By regulating securities, Congress attempted to
restore investor confidence in the national stock markets. Id.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988). Section 22 of the Securities Act of 1933 grants jurisdiction
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explicitly concerning the government interests furthered by nationwide per-
sonal jurisdiction, Congress must have believed that allowing investors to
litigate securities fraud issues anywhere in the nation was a beneficial
approach to policing the stock market and an important step in furthering
the public interest in a stable United States financial community.," The
types of disputes that fall under the FSIA, however, generally involve a
breach of a contract or a tort action between a foreign sovereign and a
specific American plaintiff.132 The entire United States is not affected in
of offenses and violations of the Act to the federal district courts. Section 22 provides:
Any such suit or action may be brought in the district wherein the defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the offer or
sale took place, if the defendant participated therein, and process in such cases may
be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever
the defendant may be found.
Id.
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules
and regulations ... may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein
the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such
cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or
wherever the defendant may be found.
Id. § 78aa.
Section 25 of the Public Utility Act of 1935 provides:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any
violation of, this chapter or rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, may be brought
in any such district or the district wherein the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts
business ... or wherever the defendant may be found.
Id. § 79y. Section 322 of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1982),
incorporates by reference the service and venue provisions of the Securities Act of 1933. Id.
Section 44 of the Investment Companies Act of 1940 provides:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any
violation of, this subchapter or rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, may be
brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is an inhabitant
or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts business or wherever the defendant
may be found.
Id. § 80a-43.
Section 214 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 provides:
Any suit or action to enjoin any violation of this subchapter or rules, regulations,
or orders thereunder, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein
the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may
be served in any district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts business
or wherever the defendant may be found.
Id. § 80b-14.
131. Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal
Courts, 79 Nw.U. L. Rv. 1, 69 (1984).
132. See, e.g. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
300, 314 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving contract claim), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Walpex
Trading v. Yacimientos Petroliferos, 712 F. Supp. 383, 386-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same); Olsen
v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 643 (9th Cir.) (involving tort claim), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 917 (1984).
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FSIA cases. Nationwide service of process, therefore, is not appropriate
under the Act.
Personal jurisdiction doctrine originally rested on notions of sover-
eignty.'33 Because courts determined that each state had exclusive power
over all persons within its borders, each state could render binding judgments
in any suits brought against those persons. 34 Additionally, courts held that
a state court could render a valid and enforceable judgment concerning the
ownership of or title to in-state property, regardless of the whereabouts of
the defendant, because the state also had sovereign power over all property
within the state's borders. 35 Courts that compare the borders of the United
States to the borders of a state and conclude that courts constitutionally
can require any defendant physically present within or having minimum
contacts with the United States to litigate in any federal court follow the
sovereignty approach to personal jurisdiction. 136 The sovereignty approach,
however, ignores the concern for fairness that the Supreme Court has
displayed since International Shoe and ignores International Shoe's require-
ment that before a court constitutionally can exert power over a defendant
the court must make an estimate of the inconveniences that would result
from a trial away from the defendant's home or principal place of busi-
ness. 37 By focusing solely on the boundaries of the forum, the sovereignty
approach allows distant litigation in which the defendant may be seriously
inconvenienced. In the case of an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign,
defending a suit in a forum that is distant from the agency's place of
business would result in inconvenience comparable to that an American
business would experience in the same situation. The interest in convenience
of the foreign state instrumentality, therefore, should receive as much
consideration as that of the domestic business.
The sovereignty approach also ignores the huge difference in size
between the territory of one state and the territory of the entire country. 3
The inconvenience that geography can impose is increased when the courts
of the forum literally span the continent. In terms of due process analysis,
this difference in degree should be significant because the larger the forum,
the greater the potential inconvenience to a defendant who is forced to
133. See J. FRDnarrsiA, Crlv PROCEDIRE § 3.2 (1985) (discussing traditional bases of
courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction).
134. See id. (discussing traditional bases for courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (stating that every state possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory).
135. See J. FRrEDENTHAL, supra note 133, § 3.2 (discussing traditional bases for courts'
exercise of personal jurisdiction); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (holding that every
state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory).
136. See Fullerton, supra note 131, at 19 (discussing application of sovereignty theory in
personal jurisdiction analysis).
137. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
138. See Fullerton, supra note 131, at 19 (determining that sovereignty theory ignores
difference in size between state and entire country).
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defend a suit away from the defendant's principle place of business. The
rationale advanced to justify the view that the Constitution offers no
protection regarding the place of trial within the federal court system focuses
on article III of the United States Constitution.'39 Article III provides that
the government vests federal judicial power in the Supreme Court and in
any lower courts that Congress may establish. 14 Article III does not mention
geographical constraints on the power of Congress to organize these lower
federal courts. The Constitution, therefore, does not mandate the congres-
sional decision to organize federal district courts along state lines and,
consequently, Congress could change the organization of the federal court
system. In fact, the text of the Constitution does not prohibit Congress
from creating one federal judicial district covering the entire country.
14'
Accordingly, some commentators argue that, if Congress can create a single
federal district court and require all defendants to appear in that court,
certainly Congress has the power to authorize each federal court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over all defendants located in or having minimum
contacts with any portion of the United States. 42
Adherents to the view that article III gives Congress unfettered power
to authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction either ignore the due process
clause or presume that the clause does not modify article III. The followers
of this view mistakenly read article III in isolation. Although other provi-
sions of the Constitution limit federal government action, 43 the fact that
article III contains no limits on the power of Congress to organize the
lower federal courts does not mean that Congress has unrestrained power
in the matter. Instead, courts must read article III as part of a unified
document and interpret article III, as much as possible, to be in harmony
with other constitutional provisions, including the due process clause.
44
Actually, courts have declared that the mere fact that the legislature enacts
an amendment indicates that the legislature intended to change the original
139. See id. (discussing impact of article III on personal jurisdiction analysis).
140. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1. Article III, § 1 of the Constitution provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compen-
sation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Id.
141. See id. (leaving establishment of lower federal court system to Congress).
142. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 603 (1878) (determining that
Congress could create one federal trial court with nationwide jurisdiction).
143. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from passing laws that abridge
freedom of speech); U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting federal government from taking life,
liberty, or property without due process of law); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment).
144. See C. BLACK, DECISION AccoRDNG To LAw: THE 1979 HoLMEs LEcrURs (1981)
(arguing for approach to constitutional analysis that emphasizes overall structure of Consti-
tution).
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act by creating a new right or withdrawing an existing one. 45 Therefore, if
the due process clause and article III conflict, the more recent part of the
Constitution takes precedence over article III. Thus, the due process clause
would take precedence over article III.
Moreover, the population growth and dispersion that has occurred
during the past 200 years well may limit the broad congressional power in
article III to create courts. Although for an early Congress to have created
only one nationwide federal judicial district with all litigation centered in
the nation's capital might have seemed reasonable, the premise that Congress
now constitutionally can create one nationwide judicial district and direct
that all proceedings take place in one city is doubtful because of the
limitations imposed by the due process clause. 146
Additionally, supporters of the sovereignty theory cannot justify the
theory on the ground that it greatly simplifies litigation. The Supreme Court
has stated that if "the cost of simplifying the litigation by avoiding the
jurisdictional question may be the sacrifice of 'fair play and substantial
justice,' that cost is too high."' 47 Furthermore, the sovereignty approach to
personal jurisdiction allows harassment of defendants. Plaintiffs have been
known to file suit in an inconvenient place for their adversaries, even at
some inconvenience to the plaintiffs. 4 8 The sovereignty approach makes
this practice constitutionally permissible as long as the defendant has min-
imum contacts with the United States.
49
In sum, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to
regularize suits involving foreign sovereign defendants. 50 Consequently, the
FSIA provides a means for courts to gain personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants that is based on the distinction between a foreign state's public
and private acts.' 5' Some courts interpreting the Act have determined that
a foreign defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole are
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on any federal district court. 52 In
Texas Trading the Second Circuit determined that the national contacts
145. See General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 724 F.2d 979, 992-94 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(holding that amendment to act indicates legislature's intent to change original act); In re
Bennett, 338 F.2d 479, 482-83 (6th Cir. 1964) (same); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Carter Oil
Co., 218 F.2d 1, 5-6 (10th Cir. 1954) (same); C. SANDs, SUT11rLrAND STATUTES AND STATUToRY
CONSTRUCTION, §§ 22.30-.32 (4th ed. 1972).
146. See Fullerton, supra note 131, at 32 (discussing effect of change in demographics on
interpretation of article III).
147. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977).
148. See Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (noting that forum in which
plaintiff filed suit was inconvenient to plaintiff).
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (limiting plaintiffs' choice of forum under FSIA); supra
note 116 (discussing effect of FSIA venue provisions on due process analysis).
150. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of FSIA).
151. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' codification of
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in FSIA).
152. See supra notes 71-104 and accompanying text (discussing courts that have required
national contacts under FSIA).
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approach to FSIA personal jurisdiction analysis was proper."3 To support
the national contacts approach, the Second Circuit relied on cases upholding
the constitutionality of nationwide service of process under federal securities
and antitrust laws. 5 4 The FSIA, however, is fundamentally different than
the securities and antitrust laws. 55 The Second Circuit's analogy, therefore,
is inappropriate and courts should examine forum state contacts, not na-
tional contacts, in analyzing personal jurisdiction under the FSIA. Addi-
tionally, the national contacts approach ignores the Supreme Court's
requirement of fairness in the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 56 Conse-
quently, courts should remain true to the fairness requirement and require
contacts between the foreign sovereign defendant and the forum state before
exercising personal jurisdiction under the FSIA.
DAVID TODD PENDERGAST
153. See supra notes 71-92 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's opinion
in Texas Trading).
154. See supra notes 119-32 and accompanying text (discussing application of securities
and antitrust cases to FSIA cases).
155. See supra notes 120-32 and accompanying text (discussing difference between FSIA
and securities and antitrust laws).
156. See supra notes 45-70 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's fairness
requirement in minimum contacts analysis).
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